Breaking Customized LLMs for Coding: Automated Red Teaming for Instruction Backdoor Attacks

LLM customization platforms allow users to build task-specific models for code intelligence tasks by embedding instructions into system prompts, without modifying the underlying model parameters. While these platforms lower the barrier to developing customized LLMs, they also introduce a new attack surface: instruction backdoor attacks, in which adversaries implant hidden malicious behaviors into customized instructions. However, existing attacks suffer from two key limitations. First, they often rely on explicit trigger patterns readily detected by platform-side or user-side inspection. Second, they require substantial manual effort to craft task-specific backdoored instructions, limiting their scalability. In this paper, we propose ARIA, an automated red-teaming framework for crafting covert and effective backdoored instructions against customized LLMs. ARIA leverages an attacker LLM to iteratively generate and refine backdoored instructions, guided by structured feedback from the target LLM along three dimensions: stealthiness, clean-task utility, and backdoor effectiveness. We evaluate ARIA on three code intelligence tasks, using four representative LLMs, and compare it with three baseline attacks. Experimental results show that ARIA achieves the highest attack success rate of 0.945, while maintaining the best clean-task utility across all tasks. ARIA also generalizes well across programming languages and remains robust to generation temperature. Furthermore, ARIA significantly outperforms existing attacks in evading platform-side and user-side detection, achieving a false negative rate of up to 1.000, and stays effective against existing defense methods, demonstrating its strong generalizability and robustness.