BM-PAW: A Profitable Mining Attack in the PoW-based Blockchain System
Abstract
Mining attacks enable an adversary to procure a disproportionately large portion of mining rewards by deviating from honest mining practices within the PoW-based blockchain system. In this paper, we demonstrate that the security vulnerabilities of PoW-based blockchain extend beyond what these mining attacks initially reveal. We introduce a novel mining strategy, named BM-PAW, which yields superior rewards for both the attacker and the targeted pool compared to the state-of-the-art mining attack, PAW. BM-PAW attackers are incentivized to offer appropriate bribe money to other targets, as they comply with the attacker's directives upon receiving payment. We further find the BM-PAW attacker can circumvent the miner's dilemma through equilibrium analysis in a two-pool BM-PAW game scenario, wherein the outcome is determined by the attacker's mining power. We finally propose practical countermeasures to mitigate these novel pool attacks.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2411.06187,
title = {BM-PAW: A Profitable Mining Attack in the PoW-based Blockchain System},
author = {Junjie Hu and Na Ruan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.06187},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
22 pages, 6 figures