This work proposes a novel proof-of-work blockchain incentive scheme such that, barring exogenous motivations, following the protocol is guaranteed to be the optimal strategy for miners. Our blockchain takes the form of a directed acyclic graph, resulting in improvements with respect to throughput and speed. More importantly, for our blockchain to function, it is not expected that the miners conform to some presupposed protocol in the interest of the system's operability. Instead, our system works if miners act selfishly, trying to get the maximum possible rewards, with no consideration for the overall health of the blockchain.
@article{arxiv.2206.10050,
title = {Better Incentives for Proof-of-Work},
author = {Jakub Sliwinski and Roger Wattenhofer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2206.10050},
year = {2022}
}