Axioms for Correlated Equilibrium
Theoretical Economics
2026-07-07 v1
Abstract
We characterize correlated equilibrium in finite normal-form games. Interpreting correlated strategies as action recommendations, we show that correlated equilibrium is the unique solution concept that never recommends a pure-strategy dominated action, treats payoff-equivalent actions interchangeably, and respects the sure-thing principle under uncertainty about payoffs and the correlation device. A parallel characterization identifies coarse correlated equilibrium among solution concepts that recommend dominant actions whenever they exist and treat payoff-equivalent actions as strongly interchangeable.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2607.06282,
title = {Axioms for Correlated Equilibrium},
author = {Florian Brandl},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2607.06282},
year = {2026}
}