Auctions and mass transportation
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-06-06 v2 Functional Analysis
Abstract
In this survey paper we present classical and recent results relating the auction design and the optimal transportation theory. In particular, we discuss in details the seminal result of Daskalakis, Deckelbaum and Tzamos \cite{DDT} about duality between auction design with bidder and the weak transportation problem. Later investigations revealed the connection of multi-bidder case to the Beckmann's transportation problem. In this paper we overview a number of works on related subjects (monopolist's problem, regularity issues, weak transportation, measure ordering etc.). In addition, we prove some new results on duality for unreduced mechanisms.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2312.08077,
title = {Auctions and mass transportation},
author = {Alexander V. Kolesnikov},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.08077},
year = {2024}
}