Addressing the escalating security vulnerabilities in Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models, this study investigates backdoor attacks targeting the visual pathway. We identify a core obstacle causing the failure of traditional attack paradigms: "Gradient Interference." This phenomenon represents an optimization failure triggered by conflicting strategies during end-to-end training. To resolve this, we propose an Adaptive Threat-Aware Adversarial Tuning (ATAAT) framework. Through its core "Threat-Method Adaptive Mapping" mechanism, ATAAT intelligently selects the optimal gradient decoupling strategy based on the adversary's capabilities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ATAAT exhibits significant advantages, achieving a highly robust Targeted Attack Success Rate (TASR > 80%) while maintaining extreme stealthiness with merely a 5% poisoning rate. It efficiently handles complex semantic-level triggers and achieves implicit decoupled attacks in data poisoning scenarios for the first time. This work reveals a critical security vulnerability in VLAs and provides theoretical and methodological support for future defense architectures.
@article{arxiv.2605.08612,
title = {ATAAT: Adaptive Threat-Aware Adversarial Tuning Framework against Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models},
author = {Kewei Chen and Yayu Long and Shuai Li and Mingsheng Shang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.08612},
year = {2026}
}