Ascribing Consciousness to Artificial Intelligence
Abstract
This paper critically assesses the anti-functionalist stance on consciousness adopted by certain advocates of integrated information theory (IIT), a corollary of which is that human-level artificial intelligence implemented on conventional computing hardware is necessarily not conscious. The critique draws on variations of a well-known gradual neuronal replacement thought experiment, as well as bringing out tensions in IIT's treatment of self-knowledge. The aim, though, is neither to reject IIT outright nor to champion functionalism in particular. Rather, it is suggested that both ideas have something to offer a scientific understanding of consciousness, as long as they are not dressed up as solutions to illusory metaphysical problems. As for human-level AI, we must await its development before we can decide whether or not to ascribe consciousness to it.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1504.05696,
title = {Ascribing Consciousness to Artificial Intelligence},
author = {Murray Shanahan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1504.05696},
year = {2015}
}