Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium
Computer Science and Game Theory
2013-07-11 v3
Abstract
We present a family of submodular valuation classes that generalizes gross substitute. We show that Walrasian equilibrium always exist for one class in this family, and there is a natural ascending auction which finds it. We prove some new structural properties on gross-substitute auctions which, in turn, show that the known ascending auctions for this class (Gul-Stacchetti and Ausbel) are, in fact, identical. We generalize these two auctions, and provide a simple proof that they terminate in a Walrasian equilibrium.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1301.1153,
title = {Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium},
author = {Oren Ben-Zwi and Ron Lavi and Ilan Newman},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.1153},
year = {2013}
}