We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) problem. The goods in our market are delays and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the FAA to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market and an LP whose solution gives an equilibrium allocation of flights to landing slots as well as equilibrium prices for the landing slots. Via a reduction to matching, we show that this equilibrium can be computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, there is a special set of equilibrium prices, which can be computed easily, that is identical to the VCG solution, and therefore the market is incentive compatible in dominant strategy.
@article{arxiv.1305.3241,
title = {An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management},
author = {Ruta Mehta and Vijay V. Vazirani},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1305.3241},
year = {2017}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1109.5214