A Practical Set-Membership Proof for Privacy-Preserving NFC Mobile Ticketing
Abstract
To ensure the privacy of users in transport systems, researchers are working on new protocols providing the best security guarantees while respecting functional requirements of transport operators. In this paper, we design a secure NFC m-ticketing protocol for public transport that preserves users' anonymity and prevents transport operators from tracing their customers' trips. To this end, we introduce a new practical set-membership proof that does not require provers nor verifiers (but in a specific scenario for verifiers) to perform pairing computations. It is therefore particularly suitable for our (ticketing) setting where provers hold SIM/UICC cards that do not support such costly computations. We also propose several optimizations of Boneh-Boyen type signature schemes, which are of independent interest, increasing their performance and efficiency during NFC transactions. Our m-ticketing protocol offers greater flexibility compared to previous solutions as it enables the post-payment and the off-line validation of m-tickets. By implementing a prototype using a standard NFC SIM card, we show that it fulfils the stringent functional requirement imposed by transport operators whilst using strong security parameters. In particular, a validation can be completed in 184.25 ms when the mobile is switched on, and in 266.52 ms when the mobile is switched off or its battery is flat.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1505.03048,
title = {A Practical Set-Membership Proof for Privacy-Preserving NFC Mobile Ticketing},
author = {Ghada Arfaoui and Jean-François Lalande and Jacques Traoré and Nicolas Desmoulins and Pascal Berthomé and Saïd Gharout},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1505.03048},
year = {2015}
}