A Matching Mechanism with Anticipatory Tolls for Congestion Pricing
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-02-14 v1
Abstract
This paper presents a matching mechanism for assigning drivers to routes where the drivers pay a toll for the marginal delay they impose on other drivers. The simple matching mechanism is derived from the RANKING algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed by Karp et al. [8]. The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is an adaption of one proposed by Dong et al. [5]. Our research proves that the matching mechanism proposed here is pareto user-optimal and can be adapted to give network optimal results for the minimizing total social cost of travel.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2002.05269,
title = {A Matching Mechanism with Anticipatory Tolls for Congestion Pricing},
author = {J Ceasar Aguma and Amelia C. Regan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.05269},
year = {2020}
}